Menezes and Monteiro, Math. Soc. Sci. (1995), show that a multi-unit discriminatory price auction does not have a pure strategy equilibrium unless one imposes some rather special conditions on the demand functions. This non-existence result might indicate a problem either with the underlying auction procedure (as Menezes and Monteiro suggest) or with the modelling approach (as we suggest). We observe that the non-existence p r oblem disappears if bids must come in multiples of smallest units|a realistic feature. Moreover, we show that most of the analysis can be r e c ast in a discrete action model. JEL classication codes. D44, C72.
Introduction
Treasuries apply two kinds of formats for auctions of xed income securities, namely uniform price and discriminatory price auctions. In the rst format, price-quantity bids are ordered with respect to price, from top to bottom. The auctioneer accepts quantities up to the amount he is selling and all winners pay the price equivalent to the highest losing bid. In the second format bids are ordered similarly, but each agent p a ys the amount equal to his bid.
At present, discriminatory auctions for bonds are more often used than uniform auctions, but some countries have been experimenting with the auction format. The United States, for instance, used to apply only discriminatory price auctions, but has recently started to issue some bonds via uniform price auctions (Nyborg and Sundaresan, 1996) . The Bundesbank switched from uniform price auctions to discriminatory price auctions for their repos (Nautz, 1995) .
Much of the debate about how to sell Treasury bills is centered around the question, which of these auction formats yields greater revenues for the Treasury (e.g. Friedman, 1960, Chari and Weber, 1992) . In order to compare the two formats, the equilibrium outcomes for each format have to bedetermined. A rather obvious prerequisite for doing this is the existence of an equilibrium in both auction formats under review.
Menezes and Monteiro (1995) (henceforth, MM) have proposed a highly stylized model of discriminatory price auctions that could qualify as a model of Treasury bill auctions. They show that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist, unless bidders face demand functions satisfying special restrictions. The non-existence is a consequence of the discontinuity of payo functions, which is due to the necessary rationing when both bidders propose the same price. MM also conjecture that utilizing mixed strategies would in general not resolve the nonexistence problem. They suggest that there is a severe non-existence problem that could impair the comparison of the two auction formats.
Non-existence might indicate a problem either with the auction procedure the model is meant to capture, or with the model itself. MM seem to imply the former: \ [ . . . ] w e show that the existence of equilibrium may be a problem even when we consider a simple model of Treasury bill auctions [ . . . ] " (MM, page 286) . In this paper, we suggest that it is rather the specic model and not the underlying auction procedure that causes the problem. Non-existence is an artifact of the MM model where prices and quantities are continuous variables. We assume instead a nite grid from which price-quantity pairs are chosen. Our note demonstrates that most of the MM analysis can be recast in such a discrete action auction model where the nonexistence problem vanishes. Moreover, a discrete action model provides a better description of reality than the continuous action model, since there are minimal increments (smallest units) of prices and quantities in actual auctions. Adoption of a continuous action model can only be justied on the grounds that it is more amenable to analysis. If the continuous version fails in this respect, we may a s w ell discard it.
Our main ndings for the discrete action model are, rst, that the nite action model has a (possibly mixed) equilibrium [proposition 1]. MM show that both bidders submit the same price in any pure strategy equilibrium of the continuous action model. We show, second, that mixed equilibria of the nite action game have a similar property: The price supports of the equilibrium strategies of both bidders are close to each other [proposition 2]. With regard to the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, we show, third, that the necessary and sucient conditions identied by MM for the continuous action model have similar counterparts in the nite action model [proposition 3]. Fourth, we nd that pure strategy equilibria of the nite action model can exhibit some excess demand [corollary 2], but excess demand vanishes in the limit as the grid becomes arbitrarily ne [proposition 5]. Fifth, there is an equivalence relationship between the pure strategy equilibria of the continuous action game and -equilibria of the nite action game [proposition 6].
In the next section 2 we restate the MM model. We construct a nite version of this model in section 3, and consider the mixed extension in section 4. Section 5 deals with properties of pure strategy equilibria. Section 6 considers the limit behavior of pure strategy equilibria as the grid becomes arbitrarily ne. Section 7 succinctly concludes. 
MM nd a set of necessary and sucient conditions for a pair of pure strategies to constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Menezes-Monteiro). A quadrupel (p; x; q; y) constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium point of the continuous action game if and only if is a grid on S, and this is the new strategy set we will use. We will call the game with this nite strategy space the nite action game, whereas the original MM game will be referred to as the continuous action game.
Note that in the continuous action game, if both bidders propose the same price, and their joint quantity bid, x + y, exceeds the available supply, Y , then the rst bidder receives Y x = ( x + y ), and the second bidder receives the rest. Yet, these quantities need not be on the quantity grid, which implies that fractions of smallest quantity units are allocated to the bidders. This is not consistent with the very idea of smallest units. We take care of that in the simplest possible way, by assuming that fractions are disposed of. (2) and payos 1 and 2 are given by (1), with the limits of integration, Z 1 and Z 2 , replaced with the new expressions Z 1 and Z 2 . We will also need the following modied demand functions:
In Remark. If the price grid is relatively ne compared to the quantity grid, and the demand schedule is steep enough, then there can be several market clearing prices, forming the set IP : = f p 2 P :
Conversely, if the price grid is relatively coarse compared to the quantity grid, and the demand schedule is at enough, then IP might be empty. Because demand schedules are downward sloping, IP is the intersection of some interval with the price grid. If this interval is larger than 2, then there is more than one market clearing price; if the size of this interval is between and 2, then there is exactly one market clearing price; if this interval is smaller than , then there is possibly no (or at most one) market clearing price.
We assume that D 1 (2) + D 2 (2) > Y , making an assumption of the continuous action MM model somewhat stronger. Note that, because both demand functions are assumed to be decreasing, this implies 2 (p; x; q; y)f(p; x)g(q;y);
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy prole (f;g) such that f 2 arg max f 0 2S 1 (f 0 ; g ) and g 2 arg max
Existence is immediate in the mixed extension of the nite action model.
Proposition 1 (existence). The mixed extension of the nite action game has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This is Nash's (1950) Theorem. QED
In the continuous action game, both bidders submit the same price in equilibrium (MM's item (i) in theorem 1). Equilibria of the nite action game in mixed strategies have a similar property: The supports of the price components of both bidders' equilibrium strategies are close to each other.
Proposition 2 (similar price supports). Given a strategy prole (f;g) ,let P and Q be the support of the price component of f and g, respectively. Formally, P := fp 2 P : 9 x f ( p; x) > 0g, and analogously for Q. If (f;g)2NE, then the Hausdor-distance of P and Q is at most . In other words, 8p 2 P 9q 2 Q such that q 2 f p ; p; p + g and 8q 2 Q 9p 2 P such that p 2 f q ;q;q +g. Proof. Suppose not. Without loss of generality, assume that there exists p 2 P such that fp ;p ; p + g \ Q = ; . W e will show that this will lead to a contradition to the denition of Nash equilibrium. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1, \ 9 q 2 Q s.t. q > p + ." Then bidder 2 can take a w a y some weight from q and put it on p + , thereby increasing his expected payo, contrary to the best response property of g. p; x; q ; y ), and hence 2 (f;g 0 )> 2 ( f;g). So g 0 is a better response for bidder 2 against f, contradicting the Nash equilibrium property.
Case 2, \ 8 q 2 Q q < p ." In other words, max Q < p . In this case, as before, but with reversed roles for both players, bidder 1 can decrease the weight on (p ; x ) and increase the weight on (max Q + ;x), for all x, thereby increasing his expected payo, given strategy g of bidder 2. QED 5 Equilibria in pure strategies
In this section we provide necessary and sucient conditions for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist (proposition 3)|a nite game counterpart of MM's theorem. We start by exploiting immediate implications of proposition 2 for Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Corollary 1 Let (p; x; q; y) 2 P Y P Y b e a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Then either p = q or (p; q) = ( ;2) or (p; q) = ( 2 ;).
Proof. Suppose (p; x; q; y) is a Nash equilibrium. As a corollary of proposition 2 we know that jp qj . There are three possible cases: p = q, p = q , and p = q + . Suppose q > 2 .
W e w ant to show that in these circumstances, no best reply of player 1 will have a price component p = q . To see this, note rst that if p = q , then bidder 1 will either receive his bid x, or the amount not purchased by bidder 2, Y y, s o Z 1 ( q ; x; q; y) = minfx; Y yg. Having dealt with all possibilities, we conclude that (q ;x) cannot be a best reply for player 1, for any x. Conversely, if p > 2 , then player 2's best reply will not have a price component q = p . As a consequence, in any Nash equilibrium, if p > 2 or q > 2 , w e m ust have p = q. If one of the prices, p or q, is less than or equal to 2, then the above argument does not go through. We then have either have p = q (equal to or to 2), or we have (p; q) = ( ;2) or (p; q) = ( 2 ;). QED Corollary 2 Let (p; x; q; y) 2 P Y P Y b e a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Then Note an interesting dierence to MM's theorem. Their condition (ii) guarantees that the market clears. In the nite action auction game, according to condition (a), market clearing provides only an upper bound for the resulting equilibrium price, so there can be excess demand in equilibrium. Condition (d), however, restrains the amount of excess demand that is possible in any pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. SUFFICIENCY. Suppose (p; x; p; y) satises (b) to (d). We have to show that this implies that (p; x; p; y) is a Nash equilibrium. In other words, we must establish that there is no alternative strategy (p 0 ; x 0 ) for agent 1 which is a better reply than (p; x), and similarly for player 2. We consider three kinds of deviations separately.
First, consider a deviation to a strategy (p 0 ; x 0 ) such that p 0 > p . These strategies have the advantage that player 1 avoids being rationed. The cheapest way to achieve that eect is by out-bidding his rival by the smallest possible price increment, . The preferred quantity to purchase for player 1 at this price is by denition D 1 (p + ). Thus, the best candidate for a better reply is (p + ; D 1 (p +)). ()) is not a better response than (p; x). This establishes that there is no protable deviation for player 1. Analogous arguments can bemade for player 2, hence (p; x; p; y) is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
NECESSITY. Suppose that (p; x; p; y) is a Nash equilibrium point. We derive conditions (b), (c), and (d) in three steps.
Step 1, \8z 2 [0; Y 2 = ( Y + y )] \ Y 9 x 2 Y s.t. Z 1 (p; x; p; y) = z , and similarly for player 2." This says that, if both players set the same price, then, for any quantity z on the grid between 0 and Y 2 =(Y + y), player 1 can always nd a quantity bid x, such that z is allocated to him. That means that there are no \holes" (besides the grid) in the set of quantities player 1 can purchase. Step 2 Step 3. In what follows, (p 0 ; x 0 ) denotes an alternative strategy for player 1. We derive the implications of the fact that in equilibrium, there cannot besuch an alternative strategy that is a better reply for player 1 against (p; y) than (p; x).
Consider rst alternative strategies with p 0 < p . In this case, player 2 will not berationed, and player 1 will receive either the amount not purchased by player 2, Y y, or his bid, x 0 , whichever is smaller. Clearly, the best candidate for an alternative move of this kind is to bid the lowest possible price, , and the demand at this low price, D 1 ( Intuitively, a ner grid moves the nite action model closer to the continuous action model. In this section we investigate in which sense this intuition is conrmed. According to corollary 1, the nite action game has two types of equilibria. One type involves the same price bids by both players (p = q, as in the continuous action game); the other type involves unequal and close to zero price bids by both bidders. Subject to some additional restriction on the demand functions, proposition 4 shows that this latter type of equilibrium ceases to exist if the grid is ne enough. From corollary 2 we know that there can be excess demand in equilibrium. Proposition 5 implies that equilibrium excess demand vanishes if the price grid is ne enough compared to the quantity grid, and if both grids become arbitrarily ne. Proposition 6 establishes that there is an equivalence relationship between the equilibria of the continuous action game and the -equilibria of the nite action game, with depending on the neness of the grid. 
, for all 0 , 0 , i = 1; 2. Let us proceed with suciently small and , i.e. 0 and 0 . Given the prices p = and q = 2 , maximization of her payo with respect to quantity has player 2 bid y = D 2 (2) s o that player 1 receives Z 1 (;x;2;y) < Y = 2 3 E . Now consider the alternative strategy (2;x 0 ) for player 1 where x 0 is chosen so that Z 1 (2;x 0 ;2;y) = Z 1 ( ;x;2;y)+kand k is maximal with k3E. Then k2E. When making this change, player 1 gains at least 2E D 1 1 (Z 1 (2;x 0 ;2;y)) and loses at most 2Y. Next Z 1 (2;x 0 ;2;y) Y = 2 < D 1 ( ). Hence D 1 1 (Z 1 (2;x 0 ;2;y)) > D 1 1 ( D 1 ( )) = . Hence the gains are at least 2E while the losses are at most 2Y. Since is suciently small, the gains exceed the losses, and (p; q) = (;2) cannot bepart of an equilibrium. QED For the next proposition, the price grid ought to be ne enough relative to the quantity grid so that the cost of raising the price by one unit is small compared with the gain from receiving a larger quantity. Given any and with D 1 (0) > 2 and D 2 (0) > 2, w e shall say D 1 (p) z 1 (x; y) + 3 has to hold. To show the claim, we distinguish two cases. Hence, for suciently large k, repeated application of the triangle inequality yields 1 (p k ; x k ; p ; y ) > 1 ( p; x; p; y) + > 1 ( p; x; p; y) + k which implies that (p; x; p; y) is not an k -equilibrium. Case p 0 < p . Use the same logic as for the case p 0 > p . QED
Conclusion
The problem of non-existence of an equilibrium in the discriminatory price auction can be overcome by resorting to the realistic assumption of smallest bid increments. The resulting nite action game shares several features of the continuous action game. For a meaningful comparison, a uniform price auction should also bemodelled as a nite action game, with the same price and quantity grids as the discriminatory price auction. Our analysis suggests that this can bedone.
